In this article
- What a minimum price actually does
- What should the minimum actually protect?
- Normal ADR is not the same thing as a minimum price
- The $220 ADR and $190 floor problem
- Incremental costs and fixed costs answer different questions
- A simple contribution example
- Stay length can change the economics
- When the minimum blocks the strategy
- Why a floor that is too high can be expensive
- The opposite problem: the floor can be too low
- The floor is a boundary, not a destination
- If everything is sitting at the floor, investigate
- Positioning still matters
- One-night stays can need different economics
- Common misconceptions
- When the rule needs more context
- What the Revenue Manager actually reviews before changing the floor
- Revenue Manager's desk: is the floor protecting us or blocking us?
- How to explain the minimum to an owner
- A lower floor does not mean a lower pricing strategy
- How often should the floor be reviewed?
- Minimum price is not minimum stay
- Minimum price is not base price
- Minimum price can override a discount
- Best practices
- Mistakes to avoid
- The takeaway
An empty night earns zero.
That fact should always be part of the minimum-price discussion.
Imagine a property that normally achieves an ADR of around $220. Tomorrow is still available. The current rate has already reached the property's configured minimum of $190. The market is weak. Comparable inventory remains plentiful. The pricing system would like to move lower, but the floor prevents it.
The operator looks at the suggested lower rate and says:
“Absolutely not. This property is worth at least $190.”
That reaction is understandable. But it raises an important revenue-management question:
What does “worth” actually mean when the night expires tomorrow?
There is a difference between what the property normally sells for, what the owner would like to achieve, what the market will currently pay, and the lowest rate at which accepting the booking still makes commercial sense. Those numbers are not necessarily the same.
A minimum price exists for a good reason. It protects the property from selling at rates that do not make economic or commercial sense. But when the floor is set too high, it can become one of the biggest barriers to last-minute conversion.
So the objective is not to eliminate the floor. It is to make sure the floor is protecting something real.
A minimum price should be based on commercial logic, not discomfort with seeing a low number.
What a minimum price actually does
A minimum price is the lowest nightly rate the pricing strategy is permitted to publish or recommend under the property's configuration. Think of it as a floor beneath the dynamic-pricing curve.
Suppose the pricing system would naturally produce $230, $210, $190, $170, $150 as conditions weaken. But the configured minimum price is $160. The system can move from $230 down to $160. It cannot move below $160. That is what the floor is supposed to do. It creates a boundary.
But the minimum price should not be confused with several other pricing concepts. It is not the base price. It is not the property's normal ADR. It is not the normal weekday rate. It is not the owner's preferred rate. It is not the lowest number that “looks acceptable.” And it is not necessarily the amount required to cover every annual property expense on that specific night.
The minimum price answers a much narrower question:
How low are we commercially willing to let this particular night go when market conditions justify it?
Base price anchors the curve. Minimum price limits how far down it can travel. The base price represents normal positioning. The minimum price represents the lower commercial boundary of the strategy. Base Price: When Should You Actually Change It? covers the anchor, and this article covers the floor.
What should the minimum actually protect?
The original purpose of a floor is sensible. You do not want an automated pricing system to keep reducing a rate indefinitely. The minimum should protect the lowest economically sensible booking rate. That can involve several considerations.
Incremental operating costs. If accepting the reservation creates additional costs, those costs matter. Examples may include guest consumables, utilities, laundry, housekeeping, turnover servicing, payment processing, and channel commissions. The exact cost structure varies significantly by operator.
Channel economics. A $160 advertised rate is not necessarily $160 retained by the operator. Channel commissions and other booking costs can materially reduce what remains.
Owner economics. Some properties operate under agreements requiring certain minimum economics. Those constraints may be legitimate.
Operational burden. A one-night reservation can create an entire turnover for relatively little accommodation revenue. The cost and effort associated with that booking may justify a stronger floor than the nightly rate alone would suggest.
Positioning. Certain premium properties may have commercial reasons not to publish extremely low rates. That does not mean the floor should be artificially high. It means economic contribution is not always the only consideration.
Probability of otherwise selling the night. This becomes especially important close to arrival. A night with strong remaining demand may deserve protection. A night tomorrow in a weak, highly supplied market creates a very different decision.
The important principle is:
The minimum should protect something specific.
If the only explanation for a $190 floor is “I don't like seeing the property under $200,” the number deserves a closer review.
Normal ADR is not the same thing as a minimum price
This is one of the most common sources of confusion. Suppose the property normally achieves $220 ADR. The operator concludes “if we normally get $220, I don't want to sell below $190.” But those two numbers answer completely different questions.
ADR asks: what average rate have our booked nights achieved?
Minimum price asks: what is the lowest commercially acceptable rate when conditions justify going that low?
The property may absolutely be worth around $220 in normal demand. That does not mean a night tomorrow in a weak market should also have a $190 economic floor. The Three Booking Windows Every Operator Should Understand established why. A night 120 days away and a night tomorrow do not contain the same amount of future opportunity. Far out, the Revenue Manager can wait. Tomorrow, almost all of that option value has disappeared.
So a rate that would be unnecessarily cheap six months out can become commercially reasonable one day out.
Time changes the value of waiting.
The $220 ADR and $190 floor problem
Consider the original scenario.
| Normal ADR | Minimum | Arrival | Market demand | Comparable inventory |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| $220 | $190 | Tomorrow | Weak | Plentiful |
At $190, nobody books. Accommodation revenue: $0.
Now imagine the property's actual economically acceptable floor is closer to $145. The pricing strategy is allowed to publish $155. At $155, the night books. That reservation is clearly less attractive than receiving $220. But $220 is no longer the realistic alternative. The relevant comparison may have become:
$155 versus $0
That is the important shift. But there is an equally important qualification: the $155 booking only makes sense if it still produces acceptable commercial economics after the relevant incremental costs.
The lesson is not “anything above zero is better than an empty night.” The lesson is:
A lower rate can still be commercially sensible when it produces positive contribution and the realistic alternative is vacancy.
Close to arrival, the real comparison may be contribution from a booking versus zero accommodation revenue from vacancy. A lower rate only makes sense when the reservation remains commercially acceptable after relevant incremental costs.
Incremental costs and fixed costs answer different questions
To understand a sensible floor, it helps to distinguish between two kinds of business costs.
Incremental or variable costs arise or increase because the booking happens. Depending on the operation, they can include channel commission, payment fees, laundry, housekeeping, utilities, guest supplies, turnover labor, and additional servicing. These are especially relevant when asking: does accepting this additional reservation still make commercial sense?
Fixed costs generally exist whether one additional night sells or not. Examples can include rent or mortgage, annual insurance, property tax, software subscriptions, some fixed salaries, and long-term overhead.
Those expenses absolutely matter. If the property cannot generate enough contribution over time to cover fixed costs and provide an acceptable return, the business itself has a profitability problem. But allocating every fixed cost to the decision about one unsold night tomorrow can produce the wrong revenue-management conclusion.
The short-term decision is closer to:
“Does this additional booking contribute something useful after the costs created by accepting it?”
The broader business decision is:
“Does the property generate enough total contribution to cover fixed costs and produce the required return?”
Those questions are related. They are not identical.
Portfolio profitability and one-night acceptance economics are different calculations.
A simple contribution example
Take an explicitly illustrative booking.
| Amount | |
|---|---|
| Accommodation rate | $160 |
| Channel commission | -$24 |
| Incremental utilities and consumables | -$8 |
| Incremental servicing | -$18 |
| Illustrative contribution | $110 |
$160 − $24 − $8 − $18 = $110.
That does not mean $160 is automatically the correct rate. It does not mean every property should accept $160. And it does not mean the operator made $110 of net profit. There may still be fixed costs, taxes, overhead, and other expenses elsewhere in the business.
What the calculation tells us is narrower:
In this simplified example, the booking creates positive incremental contribution.
That can make it commercially preferable to an otherwise unsold night. The floor should understand net economics, not just the headline nightly rate.
Illustrative example only. Actual channel fees, operating costs, taxes, cleaning arrangements, and servicing economics vary significantly.
Stay length can change the economics
Nightly rate is not always enough to understand the booking. Consider a one-night stay and a three-night stay. Suppose both sell for $160 per night.
A three-night booking produces $160 × 3 = $480 accommodation revenue with one turnover. A one-night booking produces $160 accommodation revenue with potentially the same full turnover. The cost of the turnover is therefore spread across three accommodation nights in the first example but only one in the second.
That means:
The economically sensible floor can depend on booking structure, not just nightly rate.
A one-night gap can sometimes need a different approach from a normal multi-night reservation. That becomes particularly relevant in Orphan Days: The Small Calendar Gaps Operators Often Ignore and Minimum Stay Settings: Protect the Calendar Without Blocking Demand. For now, the important lesson is simply that a minimum price should understand the economics of the reservation it can create.
When the minimum blocks the strategy
This is where a badly calibrated floor becomes especially expensive.
Suppose the property's dynamic-pricing strategy is designed to become increasingly competitive as a weak unsold night approaches arrival. The calculated recommendations are 14 days out $210, 7 days $185, 4 days $170, 2 days $155, 1 day $145.
Now suppose the configured minimum price is $190. What does the guest actually see? 14 days: $210. Then $190 at 7 days, 4 days, 2 days and 1 day.
The last-minute logic is attempting to work. But after the recommendation reaches the floor, the published rate stops moving. This is a floor collision. The system wants to become more competitive. The guardrail says no lower than $190.
The operator may then conclude “dynamic pricing is not reacting.” But the pricing logic may be reacting perfectly well. The floor is simply preventing the reaction from reaching the guest.
Why a floor that is too high can be expensive
Imagine the market is clearing last-minute inventory around $160. Your property remains at $190 because of the minimum. The rate difference may seem small. But if the market has many alternatives and guests are price-sensitive, that gap can materially reduce conversion probability.
Suppose 10 similar last-minute nights eventually expire unsold. At a hypothetical $160 conversion rate, those nights represented as much as $1,600 of accommodation revenue before incremental costs. That does not mean all 10 nights definitely would have booked. Revenue management deals in probability. The important point is that an inflexible floor can prevent the property from competing for demand that actually exists.
And this problem can be difficult to see. The operator may blame seasonality, the listing, dynamic pricing, weak demand, or competitors. But the system may already have identified the need for lower rates. The floor simply prevented the strategy from acting.
The opposite problem: the floor can be too low
A high floor can damage conversion. But eliminating the floor creates a different problem. Suppose the system is allowed to reduce rates indefinitely. A $220 property becomes $180, then $150, then $120, then $95, with no meaningful commercial boundary.
That can create several problems. The booking may contribute very little after channel and operational costs. A one-night stay may create more turnover burden than the accommodation revenue justifies. The operator may unnecessarily dilute ADR even when demand could have supported more. The public rate may become inconsistent with the commercial positioning of certain premium assets. Or the Revenue Manager may simply be selling much cheaper than necessary.
The solution is not “make the minimum as low as possible.” The solution is:
Make the minimum as low as commercially sensible, and no lower.
| Floor too high | Commercially appropriate floor | Floor too low |
|---|---|---|
| Last-minute strategy blocked | Protects economics | Weak contribution |
| Reduced competitiveness | Allows tactical flexibility | Unnecessary ADR dilution |
| Greater vacancy risk | Supports conversion where appropriate | Potential positioning concerns |
The objective is not the lowest floor. It is the right floor.
The floor is a boundary, not a destination
Suppose the economically acceptable minimum is $145. That does not mean the pricing system should immediately charge $145.
| Lead time | Illustrative dynamic rate | Minimum | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| 120 days | $230 | $145 | Floor irrelevant |
| 30 days | $205 | $145 | Floor irrelevant |
| 7 days | $175 | $145 | Floor becoming more relevant |
| 2 days | $150 | $145 | Near floor |
| 1 day | $145 | $145 | Floor reached |
The existence of a $145 minimum does not tell the Revenue Manager what to charge 120 days out. The dynamic strategy still protects future inventory. The minimum simply says:
“If conditions eventually justify going lower, this is where we stop.”
That distinction is fundamental.
The floor is a boundary, not a destination.
If everything is sitting at the floor, investigate
A healthy minimum may rarely affect much of the calendar. That is completely normal. Its job is to protect the lower boundary.
But suppose large portions of the future calendar continuously sit at the minimum. That is useful diagnostic information. Possible explanations include the minimum being too high, the base price being too high, discounts being too aggressive, seasonality being too weak, the market having structurally softened, or the pricing system expecting lower clearing prices than the operator will permit.
The correct answer is not automatically “lower the minimum.” Revenue management is diagnosis. Perhaps the floor is correct and the base is wrong. Perhaps the base is fine and the floor is unrealistic. Perhaps the market has temporarily weakened. Perhaps multiple rules are stacking unnecessarily.
A Revenue Manager should understand why dates are colliding with the floor before changing the guardrail. The same discipline applies to the whole pricing stack described in Dynamic Pricing: What Is Actually Changing Your Nightly Rate?
Positioning still matters
Economics are central to minimum-price strategy. They are not necessarily the only consideration.
Consider a highly differentiated luxury property. The operator may have a legitimate commercial reason not to publish extremely low public rates. That can relate to brand positioning, owner expectations, operational requirements, or contracted commercial constraints.
But these factors should still be explicit. The Revenue Manager should be able to say “we are protecting this floor because…” rather than “it just feels too cheap.” That is the distinction between strategy and emotion.
And it is important not to make simplistic assumptions about the kind of guest attracted by a particular price. The commercial question is whether the rate is appropriate for the property's economics, positioning, and demand conditions.
One-night stays can need different economics
Suppose the general floor is $145. A three-night booking at $150 per night produces $450 in accommodation revenue. A one-night booking at $150 produces $150. If both bookings generate a complete turnover, their economics are materially different.
That does not automatically mean a separate minimum price is required. Other controls may solve the problem more elegantly: minimum stays, gap-specific pricing, cleaning-fee structure, or length-of-stay pricing.
The important lesson for now is:
The floor should be evaluated in the context of the booking it is capable of creating.
Common misconceptions
“My property is worth $200, so my minimum should be $200.” Normal property value and minimum acceptable transaction value are not the same thing. The property can normally sell for $220 and still rationally accept $155 tomorrow if demand is weak and $155 remains commercially sensible.
“My minimum should equal my average ADR.” ADR tells you what booked nights have averaged. It does not tell you the lowest acceptable rate under every demand condition. Using ADR as the floor can prevent the strategy from responding when demand weakens.
“Every booking must cover its share of the mortgage.” The property as a whole absolutely needs to cover fixed costs and generate an acceptable return over time. But the decision about one incremental unsold night is not necessarily improved by allocating every fixed annual expense to that individual transaction. For short-term acceptance decisions, incremental contribution can be more informative.
“Any rate above zero is better than vacancy.” No. If the booking creates costs or operational burdens exceeding the revenue it generates, accepting it can be commercially unattractive. The floor still matters.
“Lowering the minimum always improves occupancy.” No. There may simply be no demand. Or the property may be unbookable because of minimum stays. Or the listing may be weak. Or guest-facing fees may be the real problem. Price is only one variable.
“Dynamic pricing will ignore the minimum if necessary.” No. A minimum price is a guardrail. If the rate calculation wants $150 and the minimum is $190, the system may publish $190. That is exactly what the floor was configured to do.
“If the rate reaches the minimum, I should manually go lower.” Not automatically. The floor should represent an intentional boundary. If the boundary no longer makes economic sense, review it deliberately. Do not bypass it impulsively.
“If I accept $155 tomorrow, that means my property is now a $155 property.” No. That rate reflects the circumstances of one highly perishable piece of inventory. It does not automatically redefine normal ADR, base price, peak-season value, or far-out pricing.
When the rule needs more context
Different properties can require different floors.
A luxury property may place greater weight on positioning and operational requirements. A budget property may operate with a different rate-versus-occupancy philosophy. A property with expensive turnovers may require stronger economics on short stays. A property where guests pay a separate cleaning fee may have different nightly economics from one where cleaning is absorbed by the accommodation rate. A multi-unit operator can have staffing efficiencies that a single-property host does not. An owner-management agreement may impose contractual pricing restrictions.
An exceptionally compressed event period may make the floor irrelevant because market rates remain far above it. And in an extremely weak period, the floor can become one of the most important controls in the strategy because many dates may approach it.
There is no universal number. The minimum must reflect the economics and commercial context of the actual property.
What the Revenue Manager actually reviews before changing the floor
A Revenue Manager should not lower a minimum simply because one night failed to book. The review starts with context.
Normal ADR. What does the property normally achieve? Useful context. Not the answer.
Base price. Is the structural pricing anchor itself reasonable? If not, the problem may sit above the floor.
Current minimum. How far below normal pricing is the current boundary?
Incremental costs. What actually changes when another booking is accepted?
Channel economics. How much of the gross rate remains after applicable distribution costs?
Stay length. Is this a one-night turnover or a multi-night reservation?
Market-clearing rates. Where is comparable inventory currently competing?
Lead time. How much future selling opportunity remains?
Floor collisions. How often does the pricing engine want to go below the minimum?
Conversion response. When the property is allowed to become more competitive, does booking activity improve?
Positioning and owner constraints. Are there legitimate commercial reasons for keeping a stronger boundary?
The Revenue Manager ultimately asks:
Is this floor protecting the business, or protecting us from seeing a number we emotionally dislike?
| Signal | Possible interpretation | Revenue Manager response |
|---|---|---|
| Rates rarely reach the floor | Floor may be fine | No action needed |
| Last-minute rates repeatedly hit floor and remain unsold | Floor may be too high | Review economics and market |
| Rates reach floor and convert acceptably | Floor may be functioning properly | Monitor |
| Floor frequently active months out | Broader pricing issue may exist | Review base, seasonality, and floor |
| Floor sits below acceptable incremental economics | Floor may be too low | Raise or protect |
| Market compressed far above floor | Floor currently irrelevant | Focus on demand capture |
Revenue Manager's desk: is the floor protecting us or blocking us?
Consider a two-bedroom urban apartment.
- Normal ADR: $220
- Base price: $200
- Minimum price: $190
- Arrival: Tomorrow
- Current published rate: $190
- Comparable market rates: $150 to $170
- Market demand: moderate to weak
- Competing supply: plentiful
- No major event is creating compression
The pricing system would prefer a rate around $155 to $165. But it cannot reach that range. Why? The floor.
Diagnosis
The market is trading below the property's current minimum. The property remains unsold. There is little remaining time. The floor is now preventing the dynamic strategy from entering the competitive range.
That does not automatically mean the floor should be changed. First, the Revenue Manager reviews the economics. Suppose a rate of $155 still provides acceptable positive incremental contribution after the relevant channel and operational costs. Now the floor looks unnecessarily restrictive. The actual economically acceptable floor may be around $145.
The Revenue Manager therefore adjusts the boundary: $190 → $145.
This does not mean the property should publish $145. The dynamic recommendation is approximately $155. So the guest sees $155. The floor simply allows the strategy to reach that rate.
If the booking converts, the Revenue Manager records the result. But they do not conclude “great, $155 should now be our normal price.” The normal ADR remains around $220. The base remains around $200. The $155 rate solved a very specific last-minute problem.
The problem was not the discount logic. The floor prevented the logic from reaching the guest. Lowering the floor does not mean publishing the floor. It simply gives the pricing strategy enough room to respond.
How to explain the minimum to an owner
A Revenue Manager should not say:
“I want to drop the minimum because $190 is too expensive.”
That sounds arbitrary. A better explanation is:
“The $190 floor is currently preventing the pricing system from responding to weak last-minute demand. Comparable inventory is competing around $150 to $170, and a rate in that range still produces acceptable incremental contribution. I recommend lowering the floor so the property can compete when the likely alternative is vacancy. This does not change our normal $220 ADR positioning or our far-out strategy.”
That explanation tells the owner what is happening, why the current floor is restrictive, what the proposed change accomplishes, and what the change does not mean.
The opposite explanation can also be useful:
“Current low-end pricing is approaching a point where the incremental contribution no longer justifies the turnover and channel costs. I recommend raising the floor so the system does not accept commercially weak bookings.”
The floor should always be explainable.
A lower floor does not mean a lower pricing strategy
This distinction deserves emphasis. Suppose normal ADR is $220, base price is $200 and the minimum is $145. That does not mean the property normally sells around $145. Most dates may still trade between $180 and $300+ depending on demand.
The $145 figure only matters when conditions push the dynamic recommendation toward the bottom of the pricing range. The floor defines the lowest boundary, not the normal selling price.
How often should the floor be reviewed?
The minimum should not change every day. But it should not be forgotten forever. Review it when something structural changes. Examples include channel commission changes, housekeeping cost changes, operating cost changes, guest servicing cost changes, owner agreement changes, the market structurally weakening or strengthening, many dates repeatedly colliding with the floor, last-minute inventory consistently expiring at the floor, or stay-length behavior changing materially.
The important principle is similar to the one in the base-price article. Do not react emotionally to every isolated date. Look for patterns.
Minimum price is not minimum stay
The names sound similar. The controls solve different problems.
Minimum price: how low can the nightly rate go?
Minimum stay: how many nights must the guest book?
Suppose the nightly rate is $160 and the minimum stay is 3 nights. A guest searching for one night cannot book. Reducing the nightly price to $140 will not solve that problem. The restriction, not the rate, is blocking the reservation.
This distinction matters because operators can mistakenly continue discounting a property that is already competitively priced but structurally unavailable to the guest's requested stay. Minimum Stay Settings: Protect the Calendar Without Blocking Demand explores minimum-stay settings in depth.
Minimum price is not base price
Base price answers: where does normal pricing begin?
Minimum price answers: how far down can pricing go?
Suppose the base price is $200 and the minimum is $145. Dynamic rates could still range from $145 to $400+ depending on market conditions. There is no requirement that the minimum be one universal percentage below base. The relationship should make sense for the property's economics and strategy.
Minimum price can override a discount
Suppose the dynamic rate before a last-minute discount is $180. A 20% discount would mathematically produce $180 × 0.80 = $144. But the configured minimum is $160.
The guest does not see $144. The published rate becomes $160. The 20% discount calculation occurred. The floor overrode its final effect.
This is another example of why operators need to understand how pricing controls interact. The discount did not necessarily “fail.” It executed inside the boundaries of the strategy.
Best practices
Give the floor a commercial rationale. You should be able to explain what the number is protecting.
Use actual property economics rather than owner discomfort.
Separate normal ADR from the minimum acceptable rate.
Monitor how often dates collide with the floor.
Consider stay length and turnover economics.
Keep lead time in context. A floor that matters tomorrow should rarely determine what you charge six months out.
Review contribution, not just the gross headline rate.
Protect positioning when there is a genuine commercial reason.
And review the floor periodically as costs and demand conditions change.
Mistakes to avoid
Do not set the minimum equal to normal ADR simply because the ADR feels comfortable.
Do not set the floor based only on owner preference.
Do not assume every incremental night must individually cover a full allocation of all annual fixed costs.
Do not ignore channel commissions.
Do not ignore turnover economics.
Do not assume any rate above zero creates positive contribution.
Do not make the floor so high that the last-minute strategy cannot function.
Do not make the floor so low that commercially unattractive bookings become possible.
Do not confuse minimum price with minimum stay.
Do not assume lowering the floor guarantees conversion.
Do not lower the floor without first understanding why the dates are unsold.
Do not interpret one tactical $155 booking as proof that the property is now “worth” $155.
And do not allow large parts of the calendar to sit permanently at the floor without investigating why.
The takeaway
A minimum price should answer one question:
What is the lowest rate at which selling this night still makes commercial sense?
That number should protect acceptable incremental economics, operational burden, positioning, owner constraints, and legitimate commercial limits. It should not simply represent the lowest number the operator is emotionally comfortable seeing.
A property with a normal ADR of $220 does not automatically need a $190 floor. If tomorrow remains unsold, market demand is weak, comparable inventory is plentiful, and a $155 booking still produces acceptable contribution, then $155 can be commercially more valuable than an empty night.
But the opposite matters too. The answer is not to remove the floor and allow pricing to collapse indefinitely. Some rates may create too little contribution. Some stay patterns may not justify the turnover. Some properties have legitimate positioning constraints. The floor still matters. It simply needs to reflect economic reality.
So if the minimum repeatedly prevents rates from entering the competitive market range:
Investigate it.
If the minimum allows bookings whose economics no longer make sense:
Raise it.
The goal is not the highest floor or the lowest floor. It is the right floor.
Remember:
The floor is a boundary, not a destination.
And when market conditions call for flexibility:
Your minimum price should protect the business without preventing the strategy from working.
Together, these ideas form the foundation of revenue management. Occupancy alone is not the objective. Dynamic pricing moves the nightly rate. Base price anchors the pricing curve. Booking windows change the value of waiting. And minimum price defines the lower commercial boundary.
The other half of revenue management is understanding the market those controls are responding to. Why can the exact same property support completely different pricing in July than in January, even before an event or unusual demand surge occurs?
That is covered in Seasonality: Find the Pattern Before Changing the Price

